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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
thoughtfully added such a clause to the 1955 amendment to the income tax
statutes." While it seems clear, from what has already been said, that the
valid portions of the statute will stand alone without a savings clause, the
addition of such a clause should eliminate all doubt. It is the final mani-
festation of the legislative intent on the question of severability.'
It may be said that the intended effect of the amendment has been
substantially accomplished, even if the phrase incorporating the prospec-
tive federal changes is declared to be invalid. But, as pointed out by Judge
Pope in the Alaska Steamship case, supra, in order for the law to be fully
effective, that phrase must be included.' Since the Montana legislature
convenes only once every two years, the interim revisions in the federal
code cannot currently be included in the Montana law, unless it remains
as it was written.
TOM HENDRICKS
NEED FOR A REPLACEMENT STATUTE TO
CORRECT EXISTING INEQUITIES
Suppose Mr. A. B. White, a business man, and Mr. C. D. Black, a
rancher, had both died the same day, each leaving an estate valued at
$60,000. If you were the widow of Mr. Black, would you expect to receive
the same amount of inheritance as Mrs. White? You probably would, espe-
cially if you had the same number of children and your husband owed no
more debts than Mr. White. You can also imagine Mrs. Black's surprise
when the court awarded her a life interest in $16,667 and $5,000 outright
as her share, while Mrs. White received $30,000.
How could the same court arrive at such divergent amounts? The
answer to this question requires an analysis of the assets of the two estates.
Mr. White, the business man, lived in a rented house which he furnished
himself. The furniture, appliances, and personal effects were valued at
$5,000. He owned an automobile with a market value of $3,000, and his
bank blance read $2,000 when he died. The shares of stock which he held,
had a value of $50,000. This gave Mr. White an estate of $60,000. Mr.
Black's estate reached the same total. The land and buildings on his ranch
were worth $50,000. ' He had a pickup and a tractor, each worth about
$1,500. The livestock was quoted at $4,000. Mr. Black had $2,000 in per-
sonal effects and $1,000 in the bank.
"Section 84-4941 reads: If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of this
act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or invalid, such decision shall not
affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.
'Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 L. Ed. 822, 42 Sup. Ct. 456 (1922).
"It should be noted that there are certain distinct differences between the Alaska
and Montana laws. The Alaska law requires the payment of a certain percentage of
the tax paid to the federal government, whereas the Montana law merely includes
the definitions of income and deductions. The tax rate is set by the Montana
statutes; only the income subject to the tax Is subject to variation by prospective
federal enactments. The Alaska tax could not be effectively administered without
inclusion of current federal changes, since it would otherwise be necessary to recom-
pute the federal tax to eliminate the effect of federal changes which had not become
a part of the Alaska law, before applying the fixed percentage. On the other hand,
the exclusion of current federal changes from the Montana law would not have so
harsh an effect, since it is already necessary to make a recomputation to allow for
additions and exclusions from income referred to in note 2 supra,
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Although these two men and their worldly belongings are hypothetical,
neither presents an abnormal type estate. The following table will show the
effect of current Montana law, under varying fact situations, upon the dis-
positions of these two estates. For purposes of comparison, the table in-
cludes the share a widower would receive, and the treatment offered by the
Model Probate Code, as well as a proposed modification to the Montana law.
SITUATIONS 1
Widow of
Mr. White
(Business-
man) takes
under
Present
Montana
Statutes:
I. No will:
spouse is sole
survivor $60,000
II. No will:
spouse and
one child
survive $30,000
III. No will:
Spouse and two
or more children
survive $20,000
IV. Inadequate will:
Spouse is sole
Survivor $40,000
V. Inadequate will:
Spouse and
one child
survive $30,000
VI. Inadequate will:
Spouse and two
or more children
survive $20,000
Widow of
Mr. Black
(Rancher)
takes under
Present
Montana
statutes:
Widower of
either Mrs.
Black or
Mrs. White
would take
under
Present
Montana
statutes:
Widow or
widower of
either Black
or White
under Model
Probate
Code Alter-
native num-
ber one
would take:
Widow or Widow or
widower of widower
of either
either Black Black or
or White White
under Model underProposedProbate Amend-
Code, Alter- ment to
native num- MontanaStatutesber two would
would take: take:
$60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000
$30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000
$20,000 $20,000 $30,000 $30,000 $20,000
$35,000 $20,000 $32,500 $30,000 $20,000
Life interest
in $16,667
and
$5,000 $20,000
Life interest
in $16,667
and
$3,333 $20,000
$18,750 $30,000 $20,000
$18,750 $30,000 $20,000
The figures presented in the table bring into sharp focus certain incon-
consistencies in the treatment of a spouse's inheritance under our present
law. The most glaring example exists in situations V and VI. Here one
widow is in a far better position than the other. Can this difference be justi-
fied? It is also obvious that the husband is in a generally inferior position
under the present law. Should a widow be assured more protection by the
law as a forced heir? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to
understand the basis for these figures. They are obtained by the applica-
tion of certain statutes.
Situations I, II, and III pose no difficult problems. They are all gov-
erned by one statute on intestate succession." Both spouses are treated
'In situations I, II, and III, the deceased has been presumed to have died intestate.
In situations IV, V, and VI, the testator is presumed to have left a will which the
surviving spouse has elected to renounce. The amount involved have been rounded
to the nearest dollar.2REv. ConEs or MONT. § 91-403 (1947).
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equally according to the number of issue surviving. The table clearly dem-
onstrates the effect of this equal and consistent treatment.
Situation IV requires the study of several statutes. The widow of Mr.
White would take under section 22-107, as amended by the 1955 legislature.'
We are assuming Mr. White left a will which Mrs. White found unsatisfac-
tory and elected to renounce. Upon making this election, Mrs. White is en-
titled to take:
• * * her share in the personal estate under the the succession
statutes, as if there had been no will, but not in excess of two-thirds
(2/3) of the husband's net estate . . .'
Mr. White's net estate was $60,000, made up entirely of personal property.
As sole survivor, Mrs. White is entitled to the entire $60,000 under the suc-
cession statute, but section 22-107 limits her to two-thirds, or $40,000.
Section 22-107 would provide Mrs. Black:
• * . her dower in the lands and her share in the personal
estate .. .
In order to translate this into a dollar value, it will be necessary to de-
fine dower as it has been interpreted in Montana. A very broad definition
is found in Corpus Juris Secundum:
Dower may be defined as the provision which the law makes
for a widow out of the lands or tenements of her husband for the
support and nurture of her children.'
Section 22-101 of the Mlontana Code defines dower as follows:
A widow shall be endowed of the third part of all the lands
whereof her husband was seized of an estate at any time during the
marriage, unless the same shall have been relinquished in legal
form.
Montana cases have consistently held that this statute preserves the dower
right as it existed at common law.' A clear statement by the Montana
Supreme Court is found in Rosenw v. Miller.' Mr. Justice Holloway, in his
opinion discusses the statute providing for dower. He states:
But what is the character of the right? (1) She has the com-
mon-law right of dower-a life estate in one-third of the land.
In the light of this interpretation, Mrs. Black is entitled to a life estate
in one-third of Mr. Black's real property. The ranch was valued at $50,000,
which means that Mrs. Black is entitled to a life interest in $16,667. She
would also be entitled to her share in the personal property as by intestacy.
Since Mrs. Black was the sole heir, she would take all of the personal proper-
ty. This amounts to $10,000.
However, Montana statutes offer Mrs. Black, as sole survivor, an alter-
native settlement. Section 22-109 provides:
'REv. CODES OF MONT. § 22107 (1947), Mont. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 231, § 1.
lbi.
5Ibid.
'28 C. J. S., Dower § 1 (1941).
'Mathy v. Mathy, 109 Mont. 467, 98 P.2d 373 (1939) ; Swartz v. Smole, 91 Mont. 90,
5 P.2d 566 (1931) ; Rosenow v. Miller, 63 Mont. 451, 207 Pac. 618 (1922) ; Dahlman
v. Dahlman, 28 Mont. 373, 72 Pac. 748 (1903).
'63 Mont. 451, 458, 207 Pac. 618 (1922).
[Vol. 17,
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If a husband die, leaving a widow, but no children, nor descend-
ants of children, such widow may, if she elect, have, in lieu of her
dower in the estate of which the husband died seized, whether the
same shall have been assigned or not, absolute and in her own right,
as if she were sole, one-half of all the real estate ..
It is obviously to Mrs. Black's advantage to elect this method. She takes
$25,000 in fee from the real estate plus the $10,000 personalty.
Situation V differs from IV only in that the widow is not the sole sur-
vivor, but, in addition, a child also survives. Mrs. White's intestate share
is reduced to one-half the personal estate, or $30,000. Mrs. Black can no
longer claim under 22-109, but must take her dower under 22-107. There-
fore, as explained for situation IV, Mrs. Black gets a one-third interest in
the real property for life. This comes to $16,667. In addition, Mrs. Black
would get $5,000 as her share in the personal estate.
In situation VI, the widow and two or more children survive. Mrs.
White's share is cut to one-third the personal estate, or $20,000. Mrs. Black
still gets the same dower as in situation V, but her share in the personal
estate is reduced to $3,333, one-third of the $10,000.
In situations IV, V and VI, the widower gets $20,000. Here we as-
sume the widow did not have her husband's consent to will more than two-
thirds of her property. Section 91-102 provides:
A married woman may make a will in the same manner and
with the same effect as if she were sole, except that such will shall
not, without the written consent of her husband, operate to deprive
him of more than two-thirds of her real estate, or of more than two-
thirds of her personal estate."
This statute is the only protection offered the husband. Section 36-131 ex-
pressly abolishes the old common law tenancy by curtesy."
The difference in the handling of the two estates can be attributed to a
single factor, dower. Simply by eliminating dower the inequality of treat-
ment would be ended. Should dower be abolished in Montana? Dower has
existed in the common law for centuries. Let's examine its advantages, dis-
advantages, and the effect of its abolition.
Montana cases have included language of glowing praise and utmost
respect for dower. Such a quote is found in Mathews v. Marsden:
'Dower being a cherished and immediate jewel of the common
law, preserved for and presented to us in a statutory setting, all
doubts are to be resolved in its favor; courts will not alow the right
of dower to be wasted and frittered away in piecemeal by sour or
austere construction, by overnice refinement in gloss. In short,
nothing except a plain mandate of the statute, or a satutory com-
mand deduced by necessary implication, will suffice to set dower
to one side. And this is so because dower, as seen above, keepeth
excellent company in the law, to wit, the company of life and liber-
ty, (the three abiding together in favor). So that the law lifts the
light of comfortable countenance thereon out of tender regard for
the widow. '
9R1V. CODES OF MONT., § 22-109 (1947).
10REV. CODEs OF MONT., § 91-102 (1947).
uREv. CODES OF MONT., § 36-131 (1947).
'271 Mont. 502, 230 Pac. 775 (1924).
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What prompted the courts to take such a high regard for dower? Pro-
tection of the widow has long been a prime concern of the law. An interest-
ing treatment of the history of dower by George L. Haskins is found in the
American Law of Property.' He says that although dower is a word of
French origin, the provisions in the English law antedate the coming of the
Normans, and its precise beginnings are lost in the dim antiquities of Ger-
man Law. In its earliest form dower included both personal and real prop-
erty. This changed during the last half of the 13th century. At this time
dower in personal property disappeared. Probably this was a result of
the recognition of land as the primary source of wealth. From that day
until this, dower has applied only to realty. In an agrarian society, such
as existed in the middle ages, where land was of chief importance, this as-
sured the widow of maximum protection. Since dower has existed in the
common law for centuries, and has been the best source of protection for
the widow, there is small wonder that it finds warm support in courts
steeped in deep-rooted precedent.
The concept of dower was born and developed in an agrarian society.
It undoubtedly performed a valuable service to that society. However,
today, we are primarily an industrial society. Although land is a valuable
source of wealth to some, to most others it is not. This change in society
has defeated much of the original value of dower. In fact, standing alone,
as the sole protection afforded a widow, dower would be unacceptable to-
day. If we agree, in principle, with the general theory of all our various
states and England, that a widow should be a forced heir and is entitled
to protection, then it is obvious that unfortunate women whose husbands
own only personal property, should not be totally excluded by the very
method designed to aid them. This would indeed be an anomalous situa-
tion.
Naturally, Montana has not allowed such an extreme injustice to exist.
Where the husband dies intestate, the wife receives an adequate share
under the intestate succession statutes. .hen he excludes her, or makes
inadequate provision for her in his will, thn she must resort to her dower
right. In the latest legislation on this subject, dower is clearly supple-
mented by a share in personal property based on the intestate succession
laws.
When the legislature of Montana decided to revise section 22-107, they
had a twofold problem. First, they had to provide adequate protection
for the widow. Second, they had to recognize a husband's right to dispose
of his property according to his own desires. In order to achieve the de-
sired result, the revised section 22-107" combines the ancient concept of
dower with the modern statutory treatment of intestate succession. How-
ever; the total benefit to the widow is subject to a limitaion. The widow
may take only up to two-thirds of the total net estate.
In drafting a two-thirds limitation on the net estate, with the reten-
tion of the old dower right, the Montana Legislature has created a difficult
problem which may lead to litigation in the future. The following exam-
ple will serve to point out the hiatus which exists in the present statute.
Suppose the testator (T), in his will, leaves his entire personal estate,
"1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPErY, : 5.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
"See note 3 supra.
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valued at $120,000, to a personal friend (A), and all his real property,
worth $60,000, to his wife (W), who is his sole heir. The wife may elect
to renounce the will and take under sections 22-107 and 22-109. If she
makes this election she is entitled to one-half the real estate, or $30,000 in
fee, under section 22-109, as her share in lieu of dower, and all of the per-
sonal estate, $120,000, under section 22-107. This gives her a total of
$150,000. However, section 22-107 limits her to two-thirds of the net
estate, which is $120,000. At this point the first serious difficulty in the
application of section 22-107 becomes evident. Since the wife can take
only $120,000, there is a sum of $30,000 which she must leave in the estate.
Should this $30,000 be left in the form of real estate, personal estate, or
should some allocation be made? It is essential to determine this point as
the personal estate withheld from W would pass under the will to A, but
the realty withheld from W could not pass to A, nor could it pass to W as
she has elected to renounce all her rights under the will. This dilemma
could be averted by withholding only personal property. However, the
same problem exists in connection with the one-half realty which does not
go to W under sections 22-107 or 22-109. She takes only one-half the realty.
The other half is left in the estate. What disposition can be made of this
remaining half? A can't take it under the will, and W can't take as she
has renounced the will. It would appear that this one-half of the realy has
become intestate property. If it is treated as intestate property it will pass
to W under section 91-403 as she is the sole heir. Surely this is not what
the legislators intended when they enacted section 22-107. Here, the wife
has taken far more than the two-thirds to which she was to be limited, and
the husband's will has been utterly defeated. This awkward situation and
its attendant problems could be avoided by the abolition of dower.
Dower was abolished in England in 1925.' In the United States dower
has been treated in a variety of ways. The statutes of sixteen states have
abolished dower." The eight community property states have expressly or
impliedly abolished it.' Only one-half the states retain dower and most of
them have modified the old common law concept of dower. Where dower
has been abolished, the legislature has usually provided a substitute for it.'
North Dakota and South Dakota are the only notable exceptions. They al-
low the husband complete testamentary control of his property.' In seven
states dower has been replaced by a share in fee of the husband's estate,
which the husband cannot defeat by will without the wife's consent.' In
ten other states the wife is entitled to one-third or one-half in fee, based upon
an intestate share.*
Abolition of dower would give the husband freedom to will his prop-
erty as he pleased. He could leave his widow absolutely nothing. This is
contrary to the tradition in the law, which has lasted for centuries. There-
fore statutory substitutes have normally been supplied where dower has
been abolished. When the Montana Legislature decided curtesy was ob-
'15 Gm. 5, c. 23, § 45(c) (1945).
1a3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, § 189, at 352 (1935).
173 i at 351.
'83 id at 352.
"Ibid.
203 id at 353.
603 id at 354,
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solete, and put .it to rest, they passed a new statute' which prohibited a
wife from willing away more than two-thirds of her property without her
husband's consent.
The Model Probate Code Committee of the American Bar Association
has abolished dower and curtesy in section 31 of the Model Probate Code.'
They propose two alternatives each numbered 32." Each of these is de-
signed to provide a substitute in the place of dower and curtesy. The Model
Probate Code differentiates between large estates and smaller ones. When
a surviving spouse elects to take against the will, under the first alterna-
tive, he may receive the share that would have passed to him had the testa-
tor died intestate until that share reaches $5,000. Of the residue which re-
mains over and above the $5,000, the survivor can take only one-half of
that share which he would have received if the testator had died intestate.
T'he second alternative is more complicated. It sets up a dividing line at
$20,000. If the estate is valued at less than $20,000, the surviving spouse
can take one-half of the estate absolutely. However, if the estate exceeds
$20,000, the survivor is given one of two elections, but not both. The first
election requires a valuation of all legacies and devises under the will at
actual value, with the exception of life beneficiary trusts. Although the
survivor is merely a life beneficiary under a trust, he must value his inter-
est at full principal value. If this valuation is less than one-half the value
of the net estate, the survivor may take the difference between the value
of such legacies and devises and the one-half, as a forced heir. The second
election allows the survivor to treat the estate, no matter how large, as if
it did not exceed $20,000 and take $10,000 absolutely. If the survivor
chooses this second alternative he may take no more than $10,000. The
drafters of the Model Probate Code have attempted to meet a threefold
responsibility: protecting the widow, achieving equal treatment for
spouses, and allowing the testator freedom of testamentary disposition.
Would it be desirable to adopt either of the alternatives of the Model
Probate Code in Montana? The first step in either event would be the
abolition of dower. Alternative number one assures the survivor of a
small estate the most protection. The survivor takes a full intestate share
until $5,000 is reached. It should be noted that this share would be sub-
ject to creditor's claims and taxes,' if the Montana intestate succession
statute' were utilized to determine this share. The drafters of the Model
Probate Code evidently felt that once the survivor received $5,000, the bare
minimum of protection had been met. From that point the survivor takes
only one-half of his intestate share. When the amounts were computed
for alternative number one under the Model Probate Code in the table,"
the intestate succession statute of the Model Probate Code was used. Ap-
plication of the Montana succession statutes would change the figure found
in situation VI. Here, the amount would be $14,167, rather than $18,750.
Protection of the widow should be the primary purpose of a statutory sub-
'Mont. Comp. Stat., § 435, c. XVI, Sec. Div., Probate Practice Act (1897); REv.
CODES OF MONT., § 91-102 (1947).
" 'MODEL PROBATE CODE, § 31, at 68.
"Id., § 32, at 68, 70. For effect of this section see table at page .....
'REv. CODES OF MONT., § 91-403 (1947).
"Ibid.
'See p. .... supra.
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NOTES
stitute for dower. The amount the widow receives under section 32 de-
pends upon the number of issue surviving. Take Mrs. White, for example.
Under section 32, as applied with the Montana intestate succession statute,"
she takes $32,500 as sole survivor, $18,750 if there is one child, and $14,167
should there be two or more issue. We assume the will to be objectionable
to Mrs. White in all three instances. It is conceivable that this will ex-
pressly disinherits the children. It hardly seems reasonable to cut Mrs.
White's share in half merely because the marriage was blessed with chil-
dren. Should these children be minors this result is even more unjusti-
fiable . Alternative number two is more complex. The Model Probate
Code explains it as follows:'
If the value of the net estate does not exceed $20,000, the sur-
viving spouse is entitled to take absolutely one-half the net estate.
This amount is first satisfied by crediting to the surviving spouse
any part of the net estate which is undisposed by the will and
which comes to him or her by intestate succession. The surviving
spouse is also credited with all legacies and devises given absolute-
ly. These are regarded as being received under the will. If this
does not make up one-half, the surviving spouse can elect to take
against the will a sufficient additional amount to equal one-half.
In so doing the surviving spouse renounces all legacies and devises
not given absolutely, such as leases, legal life estates, determinable
fees, and future interests. If the value of the net estate exceeds
$20,000, the surviving spouse may elect against the will in either
of two ways. He may elect to take $10,000 absolutely, in the same
manner as if the estate were valued at $20,000. In that case, he
receives no more, regardless of how large the estate is. The other
election against the will gives the surviving spouse one-half of the
net estate; but he must take all interests given under the will even
though they are not absolute interests. Furthermore, if the will
gives the surviving spouse a beneficial interest for life in a trust,
that gift is credited to the share of the surviving spouse at the
value of the principal from which the life income is payable, and
not at the value of the life estate. Thus, it is possible for a testa-
tor in an estate in excess of $20,000 in value, however large it may
be, to set up a trust with half his estate, giving his wife only the
income for life from that half. The wife must then either accept
the beneficial interest under the trust or be limited to taking
$10,000 absolutely.
The creators of this section of the Model Probate Code were attempt-
ing to give adequate protection to the surviving spouse and leave the pro-
visions of the will undisturbed, if possible. Unfortunately, in their effort,
they have created a section which cannot be readily understood by the
average testator or his heirs. The administration of an estate under this
section will require complicated computations and adjustment, and may
even necessitate litigation to achieve final settlement.
If it is decided to abolish dower and provide a modern statutory pro-
vision to fulfill its time-honored function, the following requirement should
be met: (1) The surviving spouse should be afforded an ample share
of his support out of the estate of his deceased spouse. (2) The right of
'"REv. CoDES OF MONT., § 91-403 (1947).
'9MODEL PROBATE CODE, § 32, at 71.
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an individual to dispose of his own property by will must be recognized
to dispose of his own property by will must be recognized and given effect.
(3) The statute should accomplish these ends as simply and directly as
possible. The following statute is proposed to meet these requirements:
1. A surviving spouse may elect to take against the will:
(a) When a married person dies testate as to any part of his
estate, a right of election is given to the surviving husband or, wife
solely under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated:
(1) Extent of election. The surviving spouse may elect
to receive one-half of the net estate, until the value of the
one-half shall amount to $10,000, and of the residue of the
estate above the part from which the one-half share amounts
to $10,000, one-fourth of the remaining net estate.
(2) Effect of election. When a surviving spouse elects
to take against the will, he shall be deemed to take by descent,
as a modified share, such part of the net estate as comes to
him under the provisions of this section.'
This proposed section gives the surviving spouse one-half the testa-
tor's estate until $10,000 has been reached. This share is subject to cred-
itor's claims. However, the homestead' and family allowance provisions'
of the Montana Code provide certain allowances to the surviving spouse
free from the claims of creditors. The share received under this proposed
section is not based upon the intestate succession formula. Since the testa-
tor has full opportunity to provide for his surviving heirs ,or to disinherit
them expressly, in his will, the amount guaranteed the surviving spouse
should not depend upon the number of surviving children. The children
are not forced heirs. The share which the testator leaves to them should be
left to his own discretion. The share of the surviving spouse should not
depend upon whether the testator is survived by one, two, or more issue.
This is especially true, in the usual case, where the issue are adults and
able to provide for themselves. The testator of a small estate is given an
opportunity to will 50% of his property as he wishes. It is felt that once
the surviving spouse has received $10,000, that his minimum protection
has been met. From that point the testator is given the right to dispose
of 75% of the remaining estate in any manner he desires.
When this proposed formula is applied in the estates of Mr. Black and
Mr. White, an equal and consistent amount is given the survivor of either
estate. In every situation, where the will is rejected by the surviving
spouse, he is entitled to $20,000. This proposed statute would end the
inequality which exists today and would provide a workable substitute for
the ancient and outmoded theory of dower.
DIRK LARSEN
OThe implementation of this proposed section would necessitate the repealing of
all statutes now contained in Title 22 of the Montana Codes and also Chapter 26 of
Title 91. This could be accomplished by a provision such as the one abolishing
curtesy or by a single section abolishing both dower and curtesy. The abolition of
dower would greatly simplify conveyancing of real estate. It would no longer be
necessary to join both spouses in the instrument of conveyance.
rav. CODES OF MONT., § 33-101 through § 33-129 (1947).
"Rv. CODos oF MONT., § 91-2401 through § 91-2407 (1947).
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